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I. INTRODUCTION
The recognition that a reasonable system of agrarian reform is
a prerequisite to economic development has led many countries to
adopt, in one form or another, some type of land reform bill. Two
countries which have enacted such laws are Cuba and Peru. This article
will discuss the history and some of the provisions of the two laws-the
Cuban Agrarian Reform Law of June 3, 1959,1 and the Peruvian Decree
Law Number 17716 of June 24, 1969.2 The Cuban law will be analyzed
in terms of its economic results; the connection between the Cuban law
and the Peruvian law will then be shown by means of the Punta del Este
Charter of the Alliance for Progress.' Similarities and differences be-
tween the two laws will be compared and the first applications of the
Peruvian law will be examined, the ultimate purpose being to show a
marked tendency for Peru to embark upon the same path that was taken
by Cuba ten years ago and which resulted in her economic downfall.
II. CUBA'S CONFISCATORY DECREES: THE FIRST LINK
On January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro's revolutionary Movimiento 26
de Julio forced capitulation of the Batista government in Cuba. Despite
* Former Editor-in-Chief, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor in
Freshman Legal Research and Writing.
1. Law of June 3, 1959, Concerning Agrarian Reform, [1959] Gaceta Oficial 7 (Cuba)
[hereinafter cited as Cuban Agrarian Reform Law].
2. Law of June 24, 1969, Concerning Agrarian Reform, [1969) Decreto-Ley No. 17716
(Peru) [hereinafter cited as Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law].
3. Pan American Union, Alliance for Progress; Off. Doc., Charter of Punta del Este, 45
DEP'T STATE BULL. 463 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Punta del Este Charter].
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the deceptive political calm of the subsequent months, during which
time there was apparently a reassessment of the corresponding foreign
policies of both the United States and Cuba, relations between the two
countries gradually began to deteriorate. The first indication that there
was some question concerning the solidarity between the two countries
came when Premier Castro and his cabinet proposed legislation 4 which
called for an extensive agrarian reform law, the results of which would
be the stripping of ranch and farm lands from the latifundists5 and the
distribution of these lands to the peasants. The legislation made no men-
tion of the protection of foreign investors; property of both Cubans and
foreigners (mostly United States citizens) was to be nationalized. Some
weeks later, on June 3, 1959, the proposed Agrarian Reform bill was
enacted into law. It was to have a profound effect on the subsequent
policies and legislation of the countries of the Western Hemisphere, at
both national and international levels.6
In atpparent response to this and other acts and statements of in-
tention by the Cuban Government, the Congress of the United States
amended existing legislation 7 in order to authorize the President to reduce
the Cuban sugar quota.8 Three days later, on July 6, 1960, President
Eisenhower exercised his power and reduced the quota by 95 percent.9
The immediate reaction of the Castro government was the enact-
ment of Law Number 851,10 ostensibly "in retaliation for political ac-
tion against Cuba,"" and under which the President and Prime Minister
of Cuba were given full power to nationalize enterprises and properties
belonging to United States citizens. Article 412 of Law 851 provided for
compensation to deprived owners in the form of 30-year bonds, bearing
interest at a rate of not less than 2 percent per year. Article 5,18 how-
ever, stipulated that payment of the bonds would be made from 25
percent of the foreign exchange received by Cuba each year from the
purchase of sugar by the United States in excess of three million long
tons, at a price of not less than 54 cents per English pound. Any pay-
ment coming from this method is generally conceded to be impossible.14
4. Law of Agrarian Reform, 7 Leyes del Gobierno provisional de ]a Revolucion 135, May
17, 1959 (Cuba).
5. This term, used in virtually all Latin American countries as a justification for land
reform, signifies the owner of a great estate made up of smaller ones. Through regular usage,
the term has come to be almost one of invective.
6. See pp. 764-66 infra.
7. Act of July 6, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-592 § 3, 74 Stat. 330, amending Act of Aug. 8,
1947 cb. 519, § 408, 61 Stat. 933.
8. The quota bad been set at 3,119,655 tons for 1960. The United States was paying two
cents per pound above the world price.
9. Exec. Proc. No. 3383, 3 C.F.R. 100 (1959), 3 U.S.C. § 1158 (1964).
10. Law of July 6, 1960, No. 851, [1960] Gaceta Oficial 12 (Cuba).
11. Id.
12. Id. art. 4.
13. Id. art. 5.
14. It would seem apparent that, given the suspension of the Cuban sugar quota
by the United States, the fund from which compensation would be paid would be
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In fact, it was pointed out in a note issued by the Department of State
on July 16, 1960, that Law 851 was manifestly confiscatory. 5 On Au-
gust 6, the Cuban Government, acting pursuant to Law 851, issued
Executive Power Resolution Number 1,16 under which it commenced its
expropriations by listing some 26 American-owned properties17 which
would thenceforth belong to the Cuban Government.
Expropriations of other privately-owned businesses came fairly
quickly. On September 17, all United States and Cuban banks were
nationalized.'" On October 13, all commercial, industrial, and transporta-
tion concerns were transferred to state ownership. 9 On October 24,
some 164 large American companies were declared, for reasons of "ne-
cessity and the national interest," to be the property of the Cuban
Government. 20 Eventually, all property owned by United States citizens
in Cuba was nationalized.
21
Finally, on December 6, 1961, the Cuban Government abandoned
any pretense that its confiscatory actions were in retaliation for "eco-
nomic aggression" by the United States. On that date, it passed Law
989,22 which gave the government the authority to confiscate all real and
personal property of "persons belonging to classes affected by revolu-
nonexistent. Moreover, it has been observed that from 1950 to 1959 the monthly
average price for Cuban raw sugar shipments to the United States at no time ex-
ceeded 5.50 cents per English pound, making meaningless the 5.75 cents requirement
of the Cuban law. Indeed in only three years ...were Cuban sugar sales to the
United States in excess of 3 million Spanish tons.
Dawson & Weston, "'Prompt, Adequate and Effective": A Universal Standard of Compensa-
tion? 30 FORDHAm L. REV. 727, 756 (1962).
15. 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 171 (1960).
16. Law of Aug. 6, 1960, Executive Power Resolution No. 1, [1960] Gaceta Oficial 15
(Cuba).
17. Number 22 of which was Compania Azucarera Vertientes Camagiley de Cuba, thus
giving rise to the celebrated case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
18. Law of Sept. 17, 1960, Executive Power Resolution No. 2, [1960] Gaceta Oficial 20
(Cuba). The second "whereas" of this Resolution began as follows: "Whereas: It is not
possible that a considerable part of the National Finances remain in the hands of the
imperialistic interests which caused the reduction of our sugar quota in an act of cowardice
and criminal economic aggression. .. ."
19. Laws of Oct. 13, 1960, Nos. 890, 891, [1960] Gaceta Oficial 24 (Cuba).
Laws 890 and 891 did recognize the right of the stockholders of the nationalized com-
panies to compensation, but the amount of compensation was left to the discretion of the
National Bank of Cuba. Payment was to be made in cash up to a maximum of 10,000 pesos
and in government bonds for anything over that amount. The bonds were to be redeemable
within 15 years, and bore an annual interest rate of two percent. No bonds were ever issued
under these laws.
20. Law of Oct. 24, 1960, Executive Power Resolution No. 3, [1960] Gaceta Oficial 25
(Cuba).
21. The Castro government in Cuba, on and after January 1, 1959, expropriated and
nationalized all properties owned by nationals of the United States in violation of the
principles of international law. Compensation has not been provided for nationals of
the United States.
it is estimated that 4,000 U.S. nationals have claims against the government of
Cuba totaling more than $1.5 billion. . ..
H.R. REP. No. 1759, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964).
22. Law of Dec. 6, 1961, No. 989, [1961] Gaceta Oficial 237 (Cuba).
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tionary measures" who had shown "unpardonable disdain for the Father-
land by abandoning the country."2 3 In this law, as opposed to Law 851,4
there was no mention whatsoever of any compensation.
The confiscatory measures of the Castro government had thus come
full circle; where the agrarian reform law made no distinction between
Cubans and non-Cubans in relation to the lands which were to be con-
fiscated, so, also, did Law 989 make no distinction between Cubans and
non-Cubans in relation to the taking of property in general. The ultimate
purpose-the transfer, to state ownership of all property in Cuba-was
thus realized.
Having provided historical perspective, it is now pertinent to take
a closer examination of the Cuban Agrarian Reform Law, which was
truly the first step leading to the decline of the Cuban economy. A com-
parison will then be made between the Cuban law and its indirect
progeny, the Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law. The remainder of this
paper will be devoted to an examination of the legal and economic
aspects of the two laws, and a prediction for Peru based on presently
discernible trends.
III. THE CUBAN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW
A. Background
The Cuban Agrarian Reform Law, which was enacted on June 3,
1959, was the final draft of a series of laws which had been proposed by
Castro as early as October 10, 1958, while he was still fighting in the
mountains.25 The earlier proposals, however, have been described as being
"carefully phrased to please both peasant and landowner,""' and thus
constituted "a sly political tool."'2 7 The right to own property was to be
respected and the former owners of land confiscated by the government
were to be paid in cash;28 but these proposals were not included in the
law which was finally enacted. The actual law, which was much more
restrictive in its terms, 20 placed less emphasis both on the rights of the
former landowners and on the benefits which were to accrue to the
peasants.
B. Terms of the Law
As finally enacted, the Cuban Agrarian Reform Law consisted of
nine chapters, divided into 67 articles. Chapters one through five de-
scribed the lands which were to be affected by the law, the manner of
redistribution and indemnification, and the types of cooperatives and
23. Id. at 23, 705.
24. Law of July 6, 1960, No. 851, [1960] Gaceta Oficial 12 (Cuba).
25. R. LOPEZ-FRESQUET, MY FOURTEEN MONTHS WITH CASTRO, 113-15 (1966).
26. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 114.
29. For example, a portion of the Law prohibited any person from possessing more than
1,000 acres. Cuban Agrarian Reform Law art. 1. See generally LOPEZ-FRESQUET, supra note
25, at 115.
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communes which were to be set up.80 Chapters six and seven created the
National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), which was to administer
all the confiscated lands.8 Chapters eight and nine covered conservation
and other general matters.8 2
More specific provisions of the Law are as follows:
Article 1: No natural or legal person may possess more than 30
cabs."8
Article 16: A Vital Minimum of 2 cabs. of fertile, non-irrigated
land, located some distance from the urban centers and dedi-
cated to the cultivation of an average economic crop, is estab-
lished for each 5-person rural family.
The National Institute of Agrarian Reform shall be in
charge of determining, in each case, what is the necessary Vital
Minimum, departing from the stated basis and considering the
average level of annual income which is desired for each family.
Article 18: The private lands cultivated by tenants, subtenants,
renters, subrenters, and sharecroppers shall be adjudicated as
belonging, free of cost, to the cultivator, when its size does not
exceed the Vital Minimum. When these workers cultivate land
of a size which is less than the Vital Minimum, they shall be
granted the lands necessary to complete it, always depending on
the economic and social conditions of the region in which they
are located.
Article 21: Those state lands cultivated by tenants, subtenants,
renters, subrenters, and squatters shall be given free of charge
to their possessors, when their size does not exceed the Vital
Minimum.
Article 29: The constitutional right of the proprietors affected
by this law to indemnification for their expropriated property
is recognized.4 This indemnification shall be fixed keeping in
mind the stated value of the farms which appears on the decla-
rations of income tax of October 10, 1958. The affected installa-
tions and buildings existing on the lands shall be appraised
independently by the authorities in carrying out this law. ...
Article 31: The indemnification shall be paid in redeemable
bonds. To such end, there shall be made a series of bonds of the
Republic of Cuba, the quantity, terms, and conditions of which
shall be determined by need. 5 The bonds shall be known as
30. Cuban Agrarian Reform Law, chs. 1-5.
31. Cuban Agrarian Reform Law, chs. 6, 7.
32. Cuban Agrarian Reform Law, chs. 8, 9.
33. One cab. (caballeria) equals 33Y2 acres.
34. Emphasis added.
35. Emphasis added. Subsequently, legislation was enacted pursuant to this article.
See text corresponding to note 37 infra.
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"Agrarian Reform Bonds" and shall be considered part of the
public debt. The series shall be for a term of 20 years, with an
annual interest of no greater than 42 %. In order to carry out
the payment of interests, amortizations, and costs of the bonds,
the corresponding sum shall be included in the budget of the
Republic each year.
Article 32: The recipients of Agrarian Reform Bonds, or their
heirs, are granted an exemption, for a period of 10 years, of the
Tax on Personal Rentals, in the proportion which is derived
by the investment which they have made in new industries over
the amount received for indemnification.
86
The Cuban Agrarian Reform Law was implemented to a certain
extent by two subsequent laws."' These laws authorized the issuance of
20-year Agrarian Reform Bonds in the amount of 100 million pesos, to
be issued in denominations of 1,000, 500, and 100 pesos, with interest
payable semiannually. " ' Compensation representing an amount less than
100 pesos was to be paid in cash." Jurisdiction over expropriation pro-
ceedings was to be vested in local judges, pending the establishment of
"soil tribunals."4 The decisions of these judges were subject to review
by the Court of Constitutional and Social Guarantees, whose findings in
the matter were final.
4 '
C. Short-Range Results of Cuban Confiscatory Decrees
In 1963, the President of Cuba estimated that as a result of con-
fiscatory and nationalization decrees,42 the following had become property
of the state: all the sugar industry; 90 percent of all tobacco and coffee
plantations; 90 percent of all industry and mining; 75 percent of all
buildings and transportation; and all of the banks. 8 A breakdown of
these figures indicates that of the 85 percent of the farmland subject to
the Agrarian Reform Law,44 approximately 4,500,000 hectares 5 had
36. Cuban Agrarian Reform Law, arts. 1, 16, 18, 21, 29, 31, 32.
37. Law of Sept. 30, 1959, No. 576, [1959] Gaceta Oficial 18 (Cuba); Law of Oct. 7,
1959, No. 588, 8 Leyes del Gobierno Provisional de la Revoluci6n 45 (Cuba 1959).
38. Law of Sept. 30, 1959, No. 576, art. 2, [1959] Gaceta Oficial 18 (Cuba).
39. Law of Oct. 7, 1959, No. 588, art. 1, 8 Leys del Gobierno Provisional de la
Revoluci6n 45 (Cuba 1959).
40. Law of Oct. 7, 1959, No. 588, art. 2, [1959] Gaceta Oficial 23 (Cuba).
41. Id.
42. Cuban Agrarian Reform Law; Law of July 6, 1960, No. 851, [1960] Gaceta Oficial
12 (Cuba); Laws of Oct. 13, 1960, Nos. 890, 891, [1960] Gaceta Oficial 24 (Cuba); Law of
Aug. 6, 1960, Executive Power Resolution No. 1, [1960] Gaceta Oficial 15 (Cuba); Law of
Sept. 17, 1960, Executive Power Resolution No. 2 [19601 Gaceta Oficial 20 (Cuba); Law of
Oct. 24, 1960, Executive Power Resolution No. 3, [1960] Gaceta Oficial 25 (Cuba); Law of
Dec. 6, 1961, No. 989 [1961] Gaceta Oficial 237 (Cuba).
43. 0. Dortic6s, La Revolucidn Cubana en su Cuarto Aniversario, CUBA SOCIALISTA 1,
2 (1963).
44. D. SEERs, A. BIANCHI, R. JOLLY, & M. NOLF7, CUBA: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
REVOLUTION 102 (1964) [hereinafter cited as SEERS]. The 85 percent figure was due to the
high concentration of land ownership and the large number of tenants, sharecroppers, and
squatters. Id.
45. One hectare equals 2.47 acres.
AGRARIAN REFORM
been confiscated by the beginning of 1961; an amount equal to just
under half of the land in farms.
46
D. Per Capita Economic Consequences of Cuban Confiscatory Decrees
Despite the approval expressed by some writers,47 as to the results
achieved in Cuba, there can be no doubt that the Cuban confiscatory
decrees, especially the agrarian reform law, have been dismal failures.
For example, prior to 1959 per capita consumption of beef, which was
the largest component of meat consumption, was in the neighborhood of
68 pounds. In 1962, the rationing system allowed 39 pounds of beef per
person. 8 Similarly, in March of 1962, ground vegetables for people over
seven years of age were rationed at 3.5 pounds per week, which averages
out to a yearly per capita consumption of some 200 pounds. This can be
compared with an average of 373.1 pounds in 1953. 41 Other figures ap-
pear in the footnote. 50 The only conclusion that can be drawn from these
statistics is that the Cuban farming system is neither productive nor
efficient.51
46. SEERS at 103. While these figures are the latest the writer could locate, it must be
assumed, in view of the high percentages named by President Dortic6s as of 1963 (see text
at note 43 supra), that at present the percentage of confiscated land is much higher, and
probably approaches the 100 percent mark.
47. It is not true that the latifundia reaches the highest productive efficiency. The
Cuban Agrarian Reform-so hated by the latifundists of Latin America, their
lackeys and their yes-men--categorically demonstrates the opposite. In Cuba the
sugar latifundists have disappeared. They have been replaced by agricultural co-
operatives, in this way maintaining the unity of production. And, in spite of all
the adverse circumstances, national and international, sugar cane production under
the cooperative system broke a record which the latifundist exploitation could
not ever reach. Against facts, there are no arguments.
R. MAcLEAN Y ESTENOS, LA REFORMA AGRARIA EN EL PERU 172 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
MACLEAN]. This book was written in 1965, some time after the results of the Cuban
"experiment" were well known. The actual facts are set out in notes 48-51 infra.
48. SEERS at 133.
49. SEERS at 135, 136.




Cane Ground 54,588.4 36,691.7 67.2
Sugar 6,141.8 4,815.2 78.2
SEERS at 131.
Food rations established in March, 1962 (per person):
Whole country







Ground vegetables 3.5 lbs/wk. (5.5 lbs
for children under 7)
Butter .125 lbs/mo.
Milk .200 Liter/day (1 liter
for children under 7)
(1966): "Today,
SEERS at 35.
51. R. LOPEz-FRESQuET, My FOURTEEN MONTHS WITH CASTRO 179
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In addition, it is recognized that the confiscatory measures of the
Cuban Government were directly responsible for the embargo imposed
by the United States5" on trade with Cuba and the termination of
diplomatic and consular relations with the United States; 53 this situation
also contributed to the general economic decline of Cuba.
IV. THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: THE SECOND LINK
A. Creation of the Charter of Punta del Este
There can be little doubt that the Alliance for Progress owes its
creation in no small part to the economic and legislative events which
occurred in Cuba during 1959-61. The Cuban confiscatory decrees, which
gave rise directly to the economic sanctions taken by the United States,"
also gave rise indirectly to the Bay of Pigs disaster of April 17, 1961,11
which brought U.S. prestige abroad to its lowest point in years. In addi-
tion, the United States recognized that Castro-type revolutions (such as
that planned for Chile in August 1961) are a threat to the political
stability of many Latin American countries. 6 This belief may be traced
directly to the relationship existing between the United States and Cuba
as a result of the latter's confiscatory policies. Thus, at the urging of
President Kennedy, the following event occurred:
In 1960 ... the ...American nations assembled at Bogota
under the auspices of the Organization of American States. The
recent Cuban crisis, partially responsible for a $500 million
authorization of American funds for the purpose of United
States bargaining at the meeting, lent urgency to the con-
ference's deliberation on the necessity of an integrated program
of Latin American regional planning in the economic and social
sphere. One year later the same states signed the Charter of
Punta del Este,5 T establishing the Alliance for Progress. 8
B. Agrarian Reform Provisions of the Charter
Apparently, in recognition of the possibility of more Castro-type
land reform systems in Latin America,59 the Punta del Este Charter, by
there are fewer factories than in 1959. In the 1960 sugar harvest, 160 sugar mills were active;
in 1965, there were only 150."
52. Exec. Proc. No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 157 (1962), 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1964).
53. 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 103 (1961).
54. See notes 52 and 53 supra.
55. MAcLEAN at 156.
56. R. OWENS, PERU 173 (1963).
57. Pan American Union, Alliance for Progress, Off. Docs., Charter of Punta del Este, 45
DEP'T STATE BULL. 463 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Punta del Este Charter] [footnotes
added].
58. Note, The Chilean Land Reform: A Laboratory for Alliance-for-Progress Tech-
niques, 73 YALE L.J. 310, 313 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
59. Comment, Puerto Rican Land Reform: The History of an Instructive Experiment,
73 YALE L.J. 334 (1963):
[T]he United States has committed itself heavily to backing the Alliance for Prog-
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reason of the economic impetus provided by the United States,60 placed
emphasis on agrarian reform and agricultural improvement. Relevant
portions of the Charter are as follows:
Title I, point 6: To encourage, in accordance with the charac-
teristics of each country, programs of comprehensive agrarian
reform leading to the effective transformation, where required,
of unjust structures and systems of land tenure and use, with a
view to replacing latifundia and dwarf-holdings by an equitable
system of land tenure so that, with the help of timely and ade-
quate credit, technical assistance, and facilities for the market-
ing and distribution of products, the land will become for the
man who works it the basis of his economic stability, the foun-
dation of his increasing welfare, and the guarantee of his free-
dom and dignity.
Title II, point 2: National development programs should in-
corporate self-help efforts directed to:
b. The wider development and more efficient use of natural
resources, especially those which are now idle or underutilized.
61
C. Effect of the Charter
In furtherance of the above-mentioned principles, which were re-
asserted in subsequent meetings,6 2 some fourteen countries, 3 not includ-
ing Cuba, have enacted some sort of land reform legislation in the decade
of the sixties. Practically none of this reform, however, has attained a
high degree of success in achieving the goals for which it was enacted.
Indeed, even as late as 1968, the following conditions existed:
3 to 8 percent of the total number of farms in Latin America
occupy 60 to 70 percent of the productive land, while 75 to 80
percent of the total number of farms, each smaller than 12
acres, cover only 5 to 10 percent of the suitable land.64
ress as an instrument for preventing the spread of Communism in the Western
Hemisphere while bettering the sorry living conditions of the working classes.
Among the broad social and economic reforms which it hopes to induce in mem-
ber countries, the Alliance has attached high priority to tenurial reform and agri-
cultural improvement.
60. The basis for the dependence of Latin American nations on United States
money and knowledge to implement their agrarian advance was established when
the members of the Organization of American States with the exception of Cuba,
committed themselves to the Alliance for Progress outlined in the Charter of Punta
del Este.
Note, Agrarian Reform as a Means to Economic and Social Developments in Peru, 50 IowA
L. REv. 526, 531 (1965).
61. Punta del Este Charter at 464-65.
62. See Thome, The Process of Land Reform in Latin America, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 9.
63. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. Progress in Land Reform,
Fourth Report, 21 U.N. ECOSOC 61, Rev. 1, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/40201 (1966).
64. Thorne, The Process of Land Reform in Latin America, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 9, 10.
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Furthermore, it was pointed out that in 1966, some five years after the
signing of the Punta del Este Charter,
the Mexican and Bolivian reforms-and the Puerto Rican...-
are the only significant Latin American land reforms (apart
from Cuba) to date.6
5
Then, on June 24, 1969, curiously almost ten years to the day after
the enactment of the Cuban Agrarian Reform Law,66 the governing
military junta of Peru passed a comprehensive agrarian reform bill,6 7
which is by far the most revolutionary and far-reaching of its kind to be
enacted since the passage of the Cuban Agrarian Reform Law itself. The
remainder of this paper will be devoted to an examination of the terms,
provisions, and projected long-range effects of the Peruvian Agrarian
Reform Law.
V. THE PERUVIAN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW: THE LAST LINK
A. History
The idea of agrarian reform has existed in Peru since as early as
1930, when President Augusto B. Leguia outlined a proposal for the
equitable redistribution of land.68 No action was taken on this proposal,
but apparently the idea was kept alive by political candidates and by
periodic peasant uprisings, in which the practice seemed to be the whole-
sale invasion of a piece of property by thousands of laborers who would
hold the land until driven off by the army. 9 As a result of these worker
revolts, which often led to bloodshed and death, in 1956 the then Presi-
dent, Manuel Prado, created the Commission for Agrarian and Housing
Reform in order to study the problem and to draft land reform legisla-
tion.70 During the four years that it took the Commission to investigate
the problem and submit its draft, the peasant invasions reached such a
peak71 that a legislative backlash was created. In the wake of this back-
lash, the bill was tied up in debate for two years and never came up for
a vote.
In 1962, presidential candidate Dr. Fernando Belaunde Terry,
whose defeat at the polls was imminent, obtained the backing of the
military and formed a junta to successfully overthrow the government.
One year later, after strengthening his position, he allowed elections to
65. Prosterman, Land Reform in Latin America: How to Have a Revolution Without
a Revolution, 42 WASH. L, REv. 189 i 196. n.23. (1966)..
66. See text corresponding to notes 25-41 supra.
67. See note 2 supra.
68. MAcLEAN at 21.
69. See generally MAcLEAN at 106-39.
70. Note, Agrarian Reform as a Means to Economic and Social Development in Peru,
S0 IOWA L. REV. 526, 537 (1965).
71. MAcLw at 107.
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take place and was elected President of the Republic.7 2 Apparently, as a
result of urging by the legislature, pressure from foreign sources (such
as the Cuban situation and the Punta del Este Charter 71) and further
peasant uprisings,74 President Belaunde Terry proposed a land reform
bill which was enacted into law by the Peruvian Legislature on May 21,
1964.7s
B. The 1964 Law
Although Belaunde's bill was called "the most radical program short
of revolution yet to be presented in the hemisphere, ' 76 in actual fact the
most novel of its features were never put into operation. The stated
purpose of the law was to increase productivity in the agricultural sector
and raise rural employment and income77 by means of a program of
land redistribution to replace over-sized and under-sized holdings with
family-sized units.
78
At the time of the passage of Belaunde's bill, only 45,942,000 acres
out of the 316,160,000 acres comprising the national territory were
devoted to agricultural and livestock units and of these, only 5,434,000
acres were under cultivation. By October 1968, the Land Reform
Office had distributed 6,819,670 acres, most of which were state-owned
jungle and other underdeveloped land; only 1,891,000 acres had actually
been expropriated. Meanwhile, the process of expropriating an additional
276,640 acres was incomplete due to lack of the necessary financial
resources.80 Thus, it can be seen that only some 4.1 percent of the devel-
oped land has been expropriated.
The slow pace at which the expropriations were proceeding was
72. Details taken from UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, Report No. 262, Labor in Peru 11 (1964).
73. See text at note 119 infra.
74. Note, Agrarian Reform as a Means to Economic and Social Development in Peru,
50 IOWA L. REV. 526 (1965). See also MACLEAN at 95-102. Proponents of the Agrarian Re-
form Bill even rallied the Catholic Church, which is a tremendous influence in every Latin
American country. A Jesuit father, Romeo Luna Victoria, declared in a television interview:
"A Catholic who is faithful to his conscience cannot be opposed to agrarian reform . ..
because then he would be a bad Catholic." MACLEAN at 96.
75. Law of May 21, 1964, Concerning Agrarian Reform, [1964] Decreto-Ley No. 15,037
(Peru).
76. Note, Agrarian Reform as a Means to Economic and Social Development in Peru,
50 IowA L. REV. 526, 540 (1965), quoting from Delmas, Peru's New Politics: The hit or
miss approach, Reporter, Oct. 24, 1963, at 36.
77. Rural per capita income for 1958 was estimated at $117. Some 52 percent of the
active population was working in agriculture in 1961. GENERAL SECRETARIAT, ORGANIZATION
O AMERICAN STATES, INVENTORY OF INFORMATION BASIC TO THE PLANNING OF AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: PERU 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as INVENTORY OF IN-
FORMATION].
78. Law of May 21, 1964, Concerning Agrarian Reform [1964] Decreto-Ley No. 18,037
(Peru).
79. INVENTORY OF INFORMATION at 18. See also COLE, GEOGRAPHY OF WORLD AFFAIRS
110 (2d ed. 1963). An estimated 100 million hectares of potential agricultural land are
presently untouched.
80. Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times, June 27, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
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probably due in part to the desire of the Belaunde government to proceed
in such a manner as not to interfere with those land operations which
were being efficiently and conscientiously managed. President Belaunde
was quoted as saying:
[W]e will undertake the redistribution of rural property, a pro-
gram which requires the liquidating of latifundia and the feudal
servitudes. We believe that latifundia are large property hold-
ings, either unexploited or insufficiently exploited, with anti-
quated tools and methods, which results in a low yield of
agricultural products; and that feudal servitude is the situation
of economic dependence of the rural worker, detrimental to his
human dignity."'
Similarly, the First Vice President of Peru, Edgardo Seoane, stated that:
[T]he Agrarian Reform . . . will not disturb the activities of
the large firms which are located near the coast and which
export their products; and there will not be expropriations of
the large Peruvian or foreign plantations. 2
Regardless of the reasons, however, it is clear that the 1964 agrarian
reform law did not achieve a high degree of success during the four years
in which it was in operation.
The following and present Peruvian Government, which like the
Belaunde regime came to power by means of a military ouster, also
assigned top priority to its own agrarian reform bill. We turn now to a
consideration of this latest and most revolutionary of all the Peruvian
agrarian reform laws.
C. The Velasco Bill
On October 3, 1968, Juan Velasco Alvarado, head of a military
junta, displaced the Belaunde government from power in Peru. On June
24, 1969, President Velasco signed the Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law.83
Strikingly similar to the Cuban law, this far-reaching piece of legislation
virtually erases the system of land tenure as it had existed in Peru.
The Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law contains 16 sections divided
into 196 articles. The preamble states, inter alia, that:
it is imperative to bring into being an authentic Agrarian Re-
form which will respond to the needs of the Peruvian people as
a whole, to the Fundamental Objectives of the Revolution and
to the necessities for the complete development of Peru .... 84
81. MACLEAN at 69, quoting B. TERRY, PROGRAMA DE Acci6N DE LA CANDIDATURA A LA
PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ARQUITECTO FERNANDO BELAUNDE TERRY (1962) (em-
phasis added).
82. La Presna (Lima, Peru), June 25, 1963, Politica al Dia [political section].
83. Law of June 24, 1969, Concerning Agrarian Reform, [1969] Decreto-Ley No. 17716
(Peru).
84. Id. Preamble (emphasis added).
AGRARIAN REFORM
Chapters I through IV of the Law deal with general matters, a
description of the land affected, the establishment of a minimum size
(three hectares) for each plot, and the procedures for putting the law
into effect.85 Chapter V deals with the procedure for estimating the value
of the expropriated property; the valuation is to be based on tax return
statements for 1968, in which the owners had evaluated their own prop-
erty. 86 Chapter VI determines the order in which the land will be dis-
tributed and to whom the land will go, with the first choice going to those
who work the land. 7 Chapter VII deals with technical assistance and
credit.88 Chapters VIII through X deal with dwarf holdings, private (non-
governmental), voluntary distributions of property, and rural com-
munes.89 Chapter XI treats the subject of farming contracts (both rental
and industrial), while Chapter XII establishes the administrative and
judicial organs of agrarian reform.90
Chapter XIII is divided into two parts; the first deals with
patrimony (estates which have descended in the same family), while the
second details the methods of financing the agrarian reform. Payments
for expropriated property are to be made on various scales. Depending
on the size of the property, payment for land being worked by a farmer-
owner will vary from 50,000 soles9' to 100,000 soles in cash, with the
rest in bonds. For unworked or underdeveloped land, the payment would
be 25,000 soles in cash and the rest in bonds.92 Pertinent portions of the
payments section are as follows:
Article 174: The Bonds of the Agrarian Debt shall be of three
classes, denominated Class A, Class B, and Class C....
Class A bonds will earn an annual interest of 6%, and
shall be redeemable by means of equal annual amortizations
and/or shares [in various industries] as stipulated by the pres-
ent law, for a term of 20 years from the date of their placement.
Class B bonds will earn an annual interest of 5%, and
shall be redeemable by means of equal annual amortizations
and/or shares as stipulated by the present law, for a term of
25 years from the date of their placement.
85. Id. chs. I-TV. An interesting portion of the Law refers to property, the principal
crop of which goes to an industrial plant. If the industrial part of the enterprise and the
land form an economic unit, the whole economic complex would be expropriated, even
though the industrial plant is located outside of the land and belongs to some third party.
Id. art. 36.
86. Id. ch. V. See also Cuban Agrarian Reform Law art. 29, p. 767 supra, for the
Cuban method of valuation.
87. Law of June 24, 1969, Concerning Agrarian Reform, [19691 Decreto-Ley No.
17716, ch. VI (Peru).
88. Id. ch. VII.
89. Id. chs. VIII-X.
90. Id. chs. XI, XII.
91. In 1961, one dollar equaled 26.81 soles. At the present time, one dollar equals 40
soles.
92. Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law, art. 177, supra note 83.
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Class C bonds will earn an annual interest of 4%, and shall
be redeemable by means of equal annual amortizations and/or
shares as stipulated by the present law, for a term of 30 years
from the date of their placement.
The bonds of the Agrarian debt and their interest are ex-
onerated from all taxes. 8
Class A and B bonds are to be given in payment for lands
worked directly by the owners and for lands which have been rented out,
while Class C bonds are to be given in payment for idle and unused
lands. 4 As to farm property other than the land itself, payment is to
be made as follows:
Article 179: When plantations, installations, constructions, or
farm or industrial equipment which forms part of the business
is expropriated, their value shall be paid in cash up to an
amount which does not exceed one million gold soles, and the
balance shall consist of Class A or B bonds, depending on
whether the lands had consisted of directly-worked property
or rented property.95
The bonds can be transferred in their entirety at face value into shares
in industrial enterprises (which had not been set up as of this writing),
in an amount equal to one-half the capital of a particular enterprise.
These industrial enterprise shares may not be transferred for a period
of ten years, unless the amount realized on their sale is also invested in
a duly qualified industrial enterprise.9 6
An interesting provision of the law is the section concerned with
land invasions by the peasants, which had occurred with such frequency
in the decade preceding the passage of the 1964 Belaunde Agrarian
Reform Bill. Special sections of the new law provide that any land in-
vaders, or people who disrupt production or incite strikes, will be treated
as saboteurs.9
7
D. Comparison With the Cuban Law
There are, of course, differences as well as similarities between the
Cuban and Peruvian Agrarian Reform Laws. The big problem with both
is the actual payment by means of bonds; well-written and comprehen-
sive provisions for payment mean nothing unless those bonds are actually
issued and distributed as fair and reasonable compensation for the ex-
propriated property."8
In this connection, it can be seen that under the Cuban Law, the
93. Id. art. 174.
94. Id. art. 177.
95. Id. art. 179.
96. Id. art. 181.
97. Id. Dispociciones Especiales (tercera). See text at notes 68-71 supra.
98. See note 19 supra. See also text at notes 13-15 supra, and note 103 infra.
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amount payable in bonds is to be determined according to a valuation
based on the 1958 income tax return filed by the legitimate owner of the
property.9 Similarly, the Peruvian law provides that the valuation will
be based on the 1968 income tax return of the owner of the property.
100
This system will, naturally, be beneficial to the honest taxpayer and
detrimental to the dishonest one. However, the problems and inequities
inherent in this form of repayment valuation seem to far outweigh the
advantages of rewarding or punishing landowners for their honesty or
dishonesty with regard to something that happened in the past and
which has no relation to land redistribution.
Any compensation should represent the value of the property
affected, and should not be based on past taxation of properties,
as in the Mexican oil expropriation of 1938 and now again in
the Cuban Agrarian Reform Law .... The assessment of taxes
. ..is based on wholly different factors and should not be
considered as a proper method for determining compensation.10'
A difference between the Cuban and Peruvian repayment systems
is in the matter of the actual amount set aside for the payment of the
bonds. Under the Peruvian law, the bonds are issued in a specific total
amount of 15 billion soles,'02 while under the Cuban law the amount of
bonds issued is to be determined "according to need,"'1 8 which means
that the Cuban Government could issue the bonds or not, as it chooses.
To date, it has chosen to do the latter; all it has done is authorize the
issuance of the bonds. By the same token, it is too early to tell whether
Peru will issue her bonds, and if so, whether she will find the money for
their payment. Fifteen billion soles is equivalent to 375 million dollars,
a considerable sum until the value of the land purchased is considered.
Under present conditions, 44,936,710 acres, representing some 88 percent
of the total farmland in Peru, is eligible to be exnropriated. 4 This aver-
ages out to some 83 cents per acre, if all the eligible land is expropriated.
Another major difference between the two laws arises in connection
with the size of the plot of land which is to be distributed to the peasants.
The Cuban law sets a minimum size of 2 cabs. (66% acres), which can
be varied by the National Institute of Agrarian Reform, and a strict
maximum size of 30 cabs. (1,000 acres) for each family plot. 0 5 The
99. Cuban Agrarian Reform Law, art. 29, supra note 1.
100. Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law, art. 63, supra note 83.
101. Domke, Foreign Nationalizations: Some Aspects of Contemporary International
Law, 95 Am. J. INT'L. L. 585, 608 (1961) (footnote omitted).
102. Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law, art. 173, supra note 83.
103. Cuban Agrarian Reform Law, art. 31, supra note 1.
104. Figures based on statistical sampling data taken from the First Agricltural Cen-
sus of Peru, July 2, 1961, as reported in PAN AmERIcAN UNIoN, AmERICA EN CnraAS, Vol.
III, No. 1, Table 7.2 (1961).
105. Cuban Agrarian Reform Law, art. 1.
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Peruvian law is quite different: it sets a strict minimum of 7.22 acres, 106
the theory being to prevent excessive subdivision among heirs to the
point of loss of efficiency. Furthermore, it also sets, as a maximum size
for each plot, a figure which can vary greatly according to the situa-
tion. 0 7 This flexibility was established so that the big agro-industrial
properties, rather than being broken up as they were in Cuba, would
be made over into cooperatives; this would also serve to reduce any
loss of operating efficiency. In addition, the size of the property to be
affected varies according to the part of the country in which it is located
and to the type of agricultural activity being carried on in that region.
Under certain conditions, established maximums may be doubled and
even tripled. In some cases, it would be possible for an owner to retain
to 3,600 acres. 08
E. Present Status of Agrarian Reform in Peru
The relatively short period during which the Peruvian Agrarian
Reform Law has been in operation makes it difficult to accurately assess
the effectiveness of that law and the degree to which it has accomplished
the goals for which it was created. There are, at present, only general
indications of the method through which Peru intends to apply the Law
in order to reach the desired results. In the absence of more concrete and
authoritative sources, resort must be made to recent newspaper articles,
periodicals, and speeches which have touched upon the Agrarian Reform
Law to obtain an up-to-date picture of how that law is being applied.
The first step taken by the Peruvian Government to implement the
Agrarian Reform Law has imparted an ominous tone to the entire Law,
reminiscent of the first moves of the Cuban Government under its own
law. On June 25, 1969, just one day after the Law went into effect, the
Peruvian Government declared that the areas which contained virtually
all the big sugar estates of the north coast were subject to land reform,
and it appointed interventors to take charge of the land. 9 This action
prompted the following criticism from a Lima newspaper which had been
generally favorable to the Agrarian Reform Law itself:
Although the agrarian reform affects all the rural property in
Peru, the government has elected to initiate it by expropriating
the richest and best-developed lands in the country, when as a
matter of fact-to avoid economic collapses-experience has
shown that the first lands affected should always be those which
are uncultivated or which belong to the state.
In effect, the first to be expropriated were the large sugar
plantations in the north, which constituted-which is recognized
all over the world-a model of efficiency in their operations.
106. Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law, art. 98.
107. Peruvian Agrarian Reform Law, arts. 31-3S.
108. Id. arts. 28, 29, 31, 34.
109. Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times, June 27, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
AGRARIAN REFORM
The high rate of efficiency reached by the Peruvian mills can
be compared only with those existing in Hawaii.
That is to say, that where there was no need for agrarian
reform . . . was precisely in the area of those sugar planta-
tions." o
This is precisely what occurred in Cuba; the well-developed, efficiently-
run lands were confiscated first, with the result that the farm economy
immediately took a downward turn.
One periodical carried a quotation from the Buenos Aires Clarin to
the effect that:
[T]he drastic decision of the military government constitutes
an act which imposes a definitive trend on that revolutionary
process. The timid rehearsals initiated by Belaunde Terry have
now been transformed into a radical program, very similar to
the Mexican or Bolivian, and with some aspects which approxi-
mate that of Cuba."'
The same publication made the statement that the Peruvian project also
had the approval of Moscow, which offered to finance the studies of a
plan to irrigate one-portion of farmland." 2 In relation to this same
matter, in July 1969 ex-President Belaunde called for an overthrow of
the military regime that removed him from power, alleging that "per-
sonalist cliques addicted to international communism" had been re-
sponsible for some of the "so-called reforms" occurring in Peru at the
present time."' The objectivity of his statements were, however, almost
certainly colored by the manner in which he made his exit from Peru.
Other publications and individuals have expressed fears that Peru-
vian agrarian reform may be the outward manifestation of a movement
similar to that in Cuba. This feeling was so widespread that President
Velasco felt constrained to issue a statement that reaffirmed the national-
istic basis of his takeover.
This is not a Marxist revolution; therefore we are not heading
in the direction of a communist society .... This is a national-
istic revolution which, without relying on unrealistic plans,
firmly proposes to alter the socioeconomic order of Peruvian
society in a radical way; because only in this manner will Peru
rapidly be able to overcome its underdeveloped state."
4
This statement, however, has been interpreted as "an effort to inspire
confidence in national and foreign investments in Peru." 115
110. La Presna (Lima, Peru), Oct. 4, 1969, § 1 at 4, col. 1.
111. Visi6N, Aug. 29, 1969, at 10, col. 3.
112. Id. at 12, col. 1.
113. The Miami Herald, July 29, 1969, § A at 3, col. 1.
114. Visi6N, Aug. 29, 1969, at 15, cols. 2-3.
115. Id.
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A strong attack on the method in which the agrarian reform is being
conducted was made by Roger Lopez, Secretary General of the Federa-
tion of Workers of Peru, who accused the government of restructuring
Peruvian agriculture in favor of a state bureaucracy, rather than in favor
of the deserving workers. "The government is not attempting to achieve
cooperativization but rather a state takeover of all national enter-
prises."
116
Another periodical compared the Peruvian law to that of Cuba by
saying that one difference is that in Peru there is no collectivization and
that there is at least a recognition of the right of the landowners to an
indemnification. It then went on to say, however, that the high percentage
of payment authorized to be made in bonds results in a recognition of the
fact that such principle of payment is more symbolic than real.1 17
In view of the above, it can be seen that the Latin American Press is
generally hostile to the methods by which the Peruvian Government has
carried out its agrarian reform program to date. This is, of course, no
indication of the ultimate success or failure of the Law, nor is it an
indication of the feelings of those who stand to benefit directly from the
application of the Law-namely, the Peruvian peasants. We can, how-
ever, gather from the foregoing that large segments of the population are
not satisfied with the methods being used to apply the Peruvian Agrarian
Reform Law. Only time will tell whether their criticism is justified or
premature.
VI. SUMMARY AND PREDICTIONS
To summarize, it can be stated that one of the main reasons given
by the Peruvian Government in justification of its Agrarian Reform Law
is the Punta del Este Charter."" This point was made abundantly
clear by General Francisco Morales Bermudez, Peruvian Minister of
Finance and Economy.
The Agrarian Reform, in effect, owes its existence to the high-
level conference at Punta del Este, and also to the start made
by previous governments of Peru, but only the present revolu-
tionary government has established actual plans to rapidly
carry forward the Agrarian Reform.1"
In turn, that portion of the Punta del Este Charter which deals with
agrarian reform owes its existence to the situation existing in Cuba after
the enactment of a revolutionary agrarian reform in that country.
What remains to be seen is whether Peru, now at the crossroads,
will choose the path taken by Cuba or will choose one leading to an
116. La Prensa Argentina, July 13, 1969, at 1.
117. THE ECONOMIST PARA AMERICA LATINA, July 9, 1969, at 31, col. 3.
118. See text at notes 59-61 supra.
119. Diario de las Americas, July 4, 1969, at 2, col. 2. See text at notes 54-58 supra.
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equitable, reasonable, and just system of land redistribution, with prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation being paid to the owners of the
confiscated property.
Peru's reliance on the Punta del Este Charter is misplaced and un-
convincing; it must be remembered that Cuba, as well, based its land
reform law on the written terms of an international document.
Whereas: In all the studies undertaken for the purpose of pro-
moting economic development, especially those done by the
United Nations, it is recognized, as an essential premise, that it
is important to put into practice an Agrarian Reform .... 12o
If Peru chooses the Cuban way, there is little doubt that the results
will be highly detrimental to Peruvian economy and society. Peru's
recent imposition of almost total censorship on the national press is an
ominous move, reminiscent of Cuba in the early days of its revolution.
In addition, the tactics which Peru has so far engaged in have already
begun to have adverse effects on her economy.
In Peru, a variety of U.S. and foreign companies have been
holding in abeyance for a year their decisions on some $600
million of new investment in mining. The loss of expected
foreign exchange earnings from these stalled investments in
part has forced the military government to seek refinancing this
fall of an $842 million debt owed to banks in thirteen foreign
countries.
121
Peru is, indeed, at the crossroads with its Agrarian Reform Law.
The path it chooses to take in interpreting and applying this Law may
well determine the economic future not only of Peru but of South America
as a whole. While it must be recognized that some system of agrarian
reform is inevitable, the example of a successful program in Peru would
act as an incentive to other Latin American countries to commence their
own reasonable programs of agrarian reform. On the other hand, should
Peru continue to engage in the same tactics that were employed in Cuba,
the result will almost inevitably be economic chaos and a corresponding
unwillingness on the part of other countries to initiate peaceful land
reform. It is to be hoped that Peru will heed the lesson to be learned
from Cuba.
120. Cuban Agrarian Reform Law, Preamble.
121. FoRrNm", Oct., 1969, at 101, col. 1.
